Bonding Over in Illinois

Bonding Over in Illinois – New Law Allows for lien release with Surety Bond
– By James T. Rohlfing

On July 29, 2015, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed into law Public Act 99-0178, which adds section 38.1 to the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act (the “Act”). 770 ILCS 60/38.1. The new law, which takes effect on January 1, 2016, permits interested parties to furnish a surety bond in exchange for the release of a mechanics lien; it provides for “bonding over” a mechanics lien and it sets forth a means and procedures for litigating over the bond which replaces the rights of a claimant under the mechanics lien act. All or almost all other states already had some procedure in place to bond over liens. Previously, in Illinois, title companies would sometimes agree to insure over mechanics lien claims. Also, some trial courts in Illinois would infrequently allow bonding over even though there was no specific law authoring it.

A broad group of people are eligible to file a petition to substitute a bond for a lien under Section 38.1; including all persons who have an interest in the property and all persons who may be liable for payment of the lien claim. A party who is authorized to file a petition to substitute a bond for the lien claim may do so at any time after: i) service of a subcontractor’s 90-day notice under Section 24; ii) recording of a lien claim; or iii) the filing of a suit to enforce a mechanics’ lien (but not more than five months after such a suit is filed).

The bond must meet certain requirements to be permitted to substitute for the lien claim. The surety must be licensed to issue surety bonds in Illinois and have a specified financial strength. The bond must be in an amount equal to 175% of the principal lien amount. The surety and principal on the bond must submit to the jurisdiction of the court and agree to pay a judgment if one is entered for the lien claimant.

Bonding over will be a useful tool to property owners and others faced with the need to clear a lien claim against property but who, for whatever reason, do not have the time, ability or desire to promptly resolve the underlying lien claim. There will be situations when it is the best available remedy. There will be many times, however, when bonding over is undesirable and litigation on the lien claim is preferable. For example, an owner might not want to pay the cost of the bond. Presumably, the surety company will require a payment or the posting of an asset equal to at least 175% of the lien amount, plus a premium for the bond to issue. Moreover, a party considering a bond might not want to lose the leverage that comes in lien litigation when the owner asserts there is no equity in the property. In addition, if an owner is attempting to prolong the litigation, the downside is that attorney’s fees must be paid to the prevailing party. A prevailing party is simply defined as either a lien claimant that recovers 75% or more of the lien claim or a bond principal, when the amount of the lien claim recovered is less than 25%. Previously, attorney’s fees were only rarely awarded under Section 17 of the Act when the court found that the owner or lien claimant acted without just cause or right.

In addition, subsection (i) provides that “the principal and surety … shall be jointly and severally liable to the lien claimant for the amount that the lien claimant would have been entitled to recover under this Act if no surety bond had been furnished, subject to the limitation of liability of the surety to the face amount of the bond.” Therefore, a party who becomes a bond principal may become personally liable when such liability would not have been imposed under the Act without

a bond. Finally, an action on a bond does not exclude other claims, such as breach of contract and quantum meruit.

Thus, the new law provides benefits to lien claimants and bond principals, but it also exacts a price against both. Many lien claimants would still rather have a lien claim, despite the additional cost to litigate and the additional avenue of recovery under a bond, simply because they believe there is more leverage in a lien – a cloud on title cannot easily be ignored. For an owner or other party who simply must remove a lien claim as a cloud against title, the new law is a benefit, but they must be wary of the additional costs and the potential for having additional liability, including attorney’s fees.


Free Webinar – Ramifications of SB-3287

This is a link to a recent webinar by Jim Rohlfing discussing the effects of new legislation making safety consultants liable under the Workers compensation law.



“The safety of the people shall be the highest law.”
Marcus Tullius Cicero

New Law Changes Exemption for Safety Companies

On June 5, 2014, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 3287 into law and it became Public Act 98-633, which is effective immediately. It modifies section 5 of the Illinois Worker’s Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5) to remove from the Act the limitation of liability for companies that provide safety consulting and other safety services– unless those companies are wholly-owned by the employer, insurer or insurance broker. Despite strong opposition from the business community, the bill hastily passed along party lines in both chambers of the legislature and was swiftly signed by Governor Quinn. The politically potent Illinois Trial Lawyers Association was the principal proponent of the bill.

Illinois business groups, including construction industry associations and, specifically, the Illinois Mechanical & Specialty Contractors Association or IMSCA are concerned about the impact of the new law on insurance rates and workplace safety. Because safety consultants are now exposed to greater liability in the event of a workplace accident, it is predicted that insurance rates for those companies will increase and, therefore, they will charge considerably higher fees for their work. In addition, some of those service companies may now be unable or unwilling to provide consulting services and, therefore, the use of safety consultants by businesses may decline. Smaller companies especially use consulting firms to provide this expertise and to assist in keeping their business compliant with OSHA standards. Some have opined that the new law will especially hurt small employers who typically cannot afford and do not require a full-time safety professional on their staff to address safety issues. There is a concern about what consequences will arise from the unavailability of affordable safety consultants. Still others in the construction industry are concerned with the impact the new law will have on safety seminars and the giving of advice related to safety issues in an educational context.

The Role of Safety Service Companies in the Workers Compensation System
As a general matter, the workers compensation laws in Illinois and elsewhere hold employers liable for work related injuries of their employees without requiring the employee to prove any fault by the employer or its agents. What the employer gets in return for this benefit to its employees is a limitation on the amount it must pay to compensate an injured employee. Section 5 of the Illinois Workers Compensation Law provided that the limitation of liability enjoyed by employers was also extended to safety service companies whom the employer hired. The new law takes that liability limitation away, except if the safety company is owned by the employer, its insurer or broker. Most are not.

SB 3287 was promoted as a means of legislatively overturning an Illinois Appellate Court decision which dismissed third party service and maintenance companies from a negligence lawsuit by an injured employee. In the case of Mockbee v. Humphrey Manlift Co., Inc., 973 N.E.2d 376 (1st Dist. 2012), Brenda Mockbee sued Harris (two related companies) and Humphrey Manlift Company after she was injured in a fall through a floor opening in a manlift platform system at Quaker Oats Company plant in Danville, Illinois, where she worked. There was no guardrail at the floor opening of the manlift. The severe injuries rendered Ms. Mockbee a paraplegic. The workers compensation case reportedly settled for $200,000, not including payment for medical treatment and lost time. Ms. Mockbee sought additional compensation in the Circuit Court for her injuries from Harris and Humphrey, who were responsible for safety inspection and maintenance of the manlift. Ms. Mockbee contended Harris and Humphrey owed her an independent duty of care and breached that duty when their inspections failed to note the need for a safety guardrail required by OSHA.

The Appellate Court agreed with the Circuit Court that Harris and Humphrey were both immune from liability for injuries sustained by Mockbee under section 5(a) of the Illinois Workers Compensation Act, as providers of safety services to the employer. The Mockbee case held that a safety engineer or inspector stood in the shoes of an employer when it provided safety services or maintenance and, therefore, it would be entitled to the same limitation of liability as the employer. It is important to note that another recent case involving a paraplegic that went to a jury trial in Illinois resulted in a verdict of $64 million. So, obviously, the limitation of liability in the workers compensation system to a settlement of $200,000 was greatly significant.

Concerns with the New Law
With the new changes to the Workers Compensation Act, concerns have been expressed that there will be a “flood of new lawsuits” or a “cottage industry of new litigation” for all significant injuries in the workplace. Some warn that safety consultants and safety inspectors will likely get sued anytime they have been consulted by an employer prior to a significant injury. Of course, it is unavoidable that some injuries will occur, even if the services provided by safety consultants and inspectors are perfect, and they will not always be perfect. So there will be some suits.

Those who opposed the law pointed out that an exemption for safety companies promoted workplace safety and that Illinois has seen some success in reducing workplace injuries. The Illinois’ injury rate is 16% lower than the national median, according to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission 2012 Annual Report. The injury rate in Illinois is lower than most states, declining significantly since 2009. The new law likely will make it more expensive for Illinois employers to utilize the services of safety companies. If that occurs, it will result in decreased workplace safety, resulting in more workers’ injuries. Many businesses are right to be concerned that the added cost of this change could cripple some small businesses and result in unnecessary and unproductive litigation. Both proponents and opponents of the change to the Act should agree that there will be more litigation against safety consultants and inspectors in the wake of this change to the Workers Compensation Act.

Plaintiffs’ lawyers would argue that holding negligent safety service companies responsible for severe injuries to Illinois workers is a worthy goal for our legal system. Arguably, making people and organizations responsible for their own deficient behavior is a principle with which there can be little disagreement. Further, making service companies responsible for their own carelessness may cause them to perform their duties more carefully, and that will, in turn, result in safer, not less safe, workplaces.

What Can be Done to Minimize Exposure?
To remedy the harmful effects of this change in the law, some companies might want to hire a full or part time safety consultant as an employee rather than an independent contractor. Of course, just calling the consultant an employee will not make him one. It will be necessary to consider the attributes of the relationship between the consultant and the employer to assure it is truly an employment relationship. Another possible outcome is that some safety companies might require indemnification agreements from the companies to which they provide services, obligating the employer to pay any damages incurred by the safety company if it is sued by one of the employer’s employees. Unfortunately, for the employer, this will have the same financially disastrous outcome caused by the so called “Kotecki” debacle, which arises when an employer indemnifies third parties against claims by its own employees. In both situations, the employer is contractually sacrificing its liability limitation under the Workers Compensation Act and risking financial ruin in doing so. The loss likely would not be covered under many commercial liability policies purchased by employers.

A Chilling Effect on Safety Training and Education
To the extent that the new law makes it possible to sue providers of safety training and education courses, it has gone too far. The construction industry heavily relies for safety compliance education and training on the Joint Apprentice Training Committees and The Chicago Construction Safety Council and other organizations offering safety training. These not-for-profit groups provide training in such areas as OSHA certifications, first aid, CPR, fall protection, working in confined spaces and more. A trade association conducting a general safety seminar for its member companies to explain how to maintain safety standards and comply with OSHA requirements is a long way from the fact scenario in the Mockbee case that the new law was intended to address. Safety training and education should be promoted, not curtailed with the threat of liability from lawsuits. The not-for-profit groups are understandably alarmed that they now must be concerned about liability if a seminar attendee has a workplace accident following a training session. The chilling effect of this presumably unintended consequence is a troubling turn that does not promote positive public policy.

One possible remedy to curb the new law’s potential overreach would be an amendment to clarify that merely providing safety education services or training seminars would not result in liability beyond the limitations in the Workers Compensation Act. The proponents of SB-3287 presumably did not intend to discourage safety training or education seminars. Further, it would be difficult to argue that a seminar sponsored by a union group or a trade association at its offices should not be encouraged as a means of helping companies and their workers reduce accidents in the workplace. The amendment could be accomplished by adding a phrase to section 5 of the Workers Compensation Act to include among those exempted from liability outside of the Act “… organizations that provide safety training or safety education ….” Trial Lawyers, the business community and other interested parties might all find such a modest change acceptable.

In conclusion, the business community is right to be concerned about the elimination of this exemption for safety companies, especially given how quickly it became law without significant deliberative consideration by the legislature. However, it is too early to predict that the change will be financially catastrophic to large numbers of Illinois businesses. The impact of the new law will only be determined after assessing the reaction of Illinois insurers, safety service firms and the courts. Meanwhile, a modest amendment to the law that assures education and training seminars are exempt would be advisable.

James Rohlfing is a principal in the law firm of James T. Rohlfing & Associates, P.C. in the Loop. He and his firm represent subcontractors. Please direct your inquiries to, or call 312-923-7100. 



The Value of Arbitration is Diminished for the Illinois Construction Industry

The merits of arbitration are widely touted as a means by which construction contract conflicts can be resolved quickly, inexpensively, and with a finality that cannot be achieved in subcontractor/general contractor disputes that are resolved through litigation in court.  That is why some contract forms include provisions for the parties to use arbitration to resolve their differences.

However, with the passage of time, judicial decisions addressing issues raised by arbitration in combination with changes to the Illinois statutes defining a subcontractor’s rights in arbitration have made arbitration more complicated, more expensive, and its results more uncertain than ever.  This tends to magnify the consequences of other long-standing defects in the arbitration process to the point where one must discount the benefits of selecting arbitration over litigation.  A review of recent developments illustrates this point.

What is the scope of the arbitration?  The standard answer is that the scope of the arbitration (i.e. the definition of what can be decided by the arbitrator and who can participate as a party in the arbitration) is defined by the terms of the contract arbitration clause.  That works so long as the contract language is clear and the parties are in agreement about what the arbitration clause allows.  However, when the arbitration clause is broad, its scope is unclear, and the parties do not agree about whether a dispute is covered, Illinois courts have decided it is the arbitrator who decides both whether the issue is arbitrable and which side wins in the dispute.  In short, a subcontractor signing an arbitration agreement can find itself arbitrating issues it never wanted to have arbitrated as well as arbitrating with or without the participation of entities it never thought it had involved in the proceedings in the first place.  When the subcontractor considers how arbitration rulings on such questions are reviewed by the courts, this is a matter of major concern.

Where will the arbitration take place and what law applies?  The Illinois legislature enacted a statute known as the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act (an IMSCA initiative) which states that, for any construction contract to be performed in the State of Illinois, contract clauses requiring dispute resolution in other states or requiring the use of the law of other states to resolve those disputes are unenforceable.  Subcontractors can rely on that statute unless the contract has an arbitration clause and the contract involves interstate commerce.  If interstate commerce is involved, the Federal Arbitration Act nullifies the protection provided by the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act.  Thus, an Illinois subcontractor who agrees to an arbitration clause with an out-of-state supplier or general contractor could find itself traveling out of state, to hire out of state lawyers, to arbitrate a dispute out of state under a different state’s laws. That likely is not what the subcontractor anticipated when it signed the contract.

Will arbitration save a subcontractor money?  The answer to this question is, “Maybe.”  Most arbitrations allow more limited pretrial discovery disclosures than would be allowed to the parties had they decided to resolve their dispute in court.  The rights of the parties to file motions attacking the other’s claims can also be severely curtailed.  The thought is that these limitations act in combination to streamline litigation and save costs.  However, if the contract arbitration clause is silent on what rules apply to the arbitration or the rules identified in the contract are ambiguous, then the rules of procedure in arbitration are, themselves, something that may have to be litigated in arbitration along with the merits of the dispute.

There are still discovery costs in arbitration (most often involving productions of documents and depositions) while arbitration imposes additional costs which judicial litigation never imposes.  A subcontractor who takes his dispute to court does not have to pay for the judge’s salary.  In arbitration, the parties typically each pay for half of the arbitrator’s time.  Arbitrators often charge an hourly rate that is the same or higher than the subcontractor’s own attorney may be charging.  If the arbitration hearing is prolonged (and complicated construction projects commonly can take a long time to present in arbitration), the subcontractor’s half of the arbitrators’ salaries could exceed whatever savings the subcontractor thought it was gaining by choosing arbitration in the first place.  Remember, an arbitration award may be overturned on the basis of a claim that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence.  This amounts to an invitation for both parties to bury an arbitrator with materials that an arbitrator has a financial and legal incentive to consider but which a trial court would never permit.

Has a subcontractor agreed to arbitrate and can it get out of it?  Since the right to arbitrate is created by agreement of the parties, if the parties to a construction contract later agree to change their agreement and not arbitrate, they can do so.  But, recent Illinois judicial decisions have made the answers to these questions much more uncertain in other circumstances.  First, the general rule is that, when parties agree to a valid arbitration clause, they are irrevocably committed to arbitrating all issues clearly falling with the scope of their arbitration agreement.  But, what if it is not clear whether the parties have agreed?  What if the arbitration clause is not in the subcontract but is buried in some other document the subcontractor may not have read but which one side or the other believes is part of the “contract documents”?  Subcontracts can incorporate binding arbitration clauses by reference but Illinois courts have held that whether that has happened in any particular case can depend upon a judicial interpretation of the intent of the parties, the clarity of the incorporation, and the common practices of the construction trade involved.  In short, a subcontractor can find itself litigating in court the question of whether it will be settling its disputes in arbitration.

As for the “irrevocable commitment” to arbitrate issues falling with the scope of the arbitration clause, at least one recent Illinois judicial decision has called that commitment into question, as well.  What if a subcontractor has an agreement with a general contractor or supplier containing an arbitration clause and a mechanics lien is filed?  If the party against whom the lien is filed serves the lien claimant with what is known as “a Section 34 Demand” (a statutorily defined demand that a lien claimant file suit to foreclose on the lien within 30 days to avoid forfeiture of all lien rights), the service of such a notice on the lien claimant can constitute a waiver of the arbitration rights the parties had previously agreed to in their contract!

If a subcontractor believes that the arbitrator’s ruling is mistaken, is legal redress in court likely to reverse or vacate the ruling?  If a case is resolved through a trial before a court, the losing party always has a right to appeal and to ask the appellate court to review and possibly reverse every critical decision the trial court made.  That is not the case for arbitration.  Traditionally, Illinois courts have been very reluctant to second-guess an arbitration ruling.  Thus, a court should not reverse or vacate an arbitration ruling simply because it believes it would have reached a different conclusion, or because it believes the award is illogical or inconsistent, or because the arbitrator made errors in judgment or mistakes of law or fact.  Arbitration laws limit the grounds for overturning awards to cases in which results are based on fraud or corruption, arbitrator partiality or misconduct, arbitrator refusals to hear evidence, arbitrator delays of the hearing, there was no agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and the award on its face shows a gross error of law or fact or a manifest disregard for the law.

The Illinois arbitration act was amended effective January 1, 2011.  The amendments imposed additional requirements on the substance of the award.  Because the amendments were recent, their full impact has not yet been worked out by Illinois courts.  This has a potentially huge impact on the cost of arbitration and upon the certainty of its outcomes, and it raises a number of questions about arbitration proceedings.

For example, do the increased requirements increase the bases upon which a court can vacate an award?

The amendments state that the arbitrator “shall” decide the dispute in accord with any rules of law chosen by the parties?  What if the arbitrator does not?  What if the parties do not agree?

As another example, the amendments state that the arbitrators shall rule in accord with the terms of the parties’ contract while taking into account the usages of the trade applicable to the matters at hand.  What if the arbitrator does not?  What if the usages of the trade and the terms of the contract are in conflict?

At the very least, these amendments invite the losing party in arbitration to submit far more information and to make far more elaborate arguments before a trial or appellate court than would have been allowed before the amendments had been made.  A party seeking confirmation and enforcement of an arbitration award may easily find itself practically re-litigating the arbitration before the trial court in order to prove that the applicable law, contract, and usages of the trade were sufficiently followed by the arbitrator in order to establish that a viable and enforceable award has been rendered.

With the increased uncertainty of arbitration, it is less likely to save time and money for the parties

By: David J. Lloyd


*Also published in IMSCA SubStance, Spring 2014.


Integration Clauses in Illinois Construction Contracts

In the State of Illinois, many contracts, especially construction contracts, include what are known as “integration” or “merger” clauses which essentially state that the agreement being signed is the final and complete agreement.

Such clauses generally include language like this:

“This Contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with regard to the subject matter of the agreement.  It supersedes any and all prior agreements, understandings, representations, negotiations, or communications, written or oral, regarding the subject of this agreement…”

Illinois courts have found that the purpose of integration clauses is to serve as an indication that the parties intended their written contract to be the final expression of their agreement replacing all prior expressions and discussions of their agreement.  Such clauses are designed to protect against the misinterpretation of the contract terms through arguments relying upon extrinsic or outside evidence, such as, oral communications between the parties during negotiations or even other written documents.   Thus, the clauses serve more as a limit upon the evidence one might introduce in an arbitration or trial to resolve a construction dispute than as a term which can be relied upon to implement the contract in the first place.

These clauses become important when contracting parties have a dispute in which one or the other relies upon things said or allegedly “understood” by all before entering the contract or during its implementation when those communications were not actually reduced to writing and specifically incorporated into the agreement.    The argument goes: “If that was supposed to be part of our agreement, we would have said so.”  Thus, it is essential that any party entering a contract makes certain that all material representations or prior understandings about the construction project are explicitly stated in the body of their contract if either of the negotiating parties wants to include an integration clause in the agreement.

Finally, “integration clauses” are not always the final word on whether extrinsic evidence may be used to alter or interpret the terms of an agreement.  For example, if the terms of the agreement are ambiguous then a judge or arbitrator might have no other choice but to look outside the terms of an agreement in order to resolve a dispute.  If you are performing your work and believe that your circumstance could justify circumvention of the limitations imposed by an integration clause, you should consult your attorney.  However, the best practice is to be certain that all material terms of any agreement are as complete and comprehensive as the parties can make them.

David J. Lloyd 



“Big Boy” Clauses in Illinois Construction Contracts

Illinois construction contracts frequently include what are known as “big boy clauses” which typically include language saying that the parties are not relying upon any representations or disclosures they have received from the other side prior to entering the contract.  The clauses also typically state that the parties have had the opportunity to make appropriate investigations and independently determine the accuracy of the facts upon which they are relying to enter the agreement.

They are called “big boy clauses” because the contracting parties are allegedly using them to say, in effect, that they are big boys and can take care of themselves.   These “big boy clauses” are often used to defeat efforts to incorporate important project information into an agreement or into the interpretation of an agreement that cannot otherwise be found there.  Reliance upon these clauses is particularly common in cases involving fraud where one party claims that the other lied about something in order to induce the other to enter an agreement it would not have entered or at least not have entered on the terms it did.  The clauses are most effective where the parties are, in fact, “big boys” with scores of lawyers and experts they can call upon when negotiating a contract.

Fortunately, Illinois courts are less willing to enforce such terms when the parties are on substantially unequal footing as frequently occurs in the construction industry.  However, this does not mean that such clauses will not be enforced, but with the help of counsel, there may be a basis for a court to rely upon to ignore the application of such terms when resolving a construction dispute.

There is one rather spectacular exception to this rule: government contracts, especially government contracts involving excavation.  One cannot sue federal, state, county, or municipal officials or entities for fraud in the performance of their official duties.  Thus, there is an enormous temptation for governmental bodies to withhold information (especially about subsurface conditions) in order to rig the competitive bidding process to get the lowest price.  The use of a “big boy clause” can be a very effective defense when a bidder/excavator discovers the truth about the construction site to its chagrin.  To offset that temptation, the federal government and the State of Illinois have adopted the “superior knowledge rule” in proceedings before the Illinois Court of Claims and before various federal boards of contract appeals.  This Rule is designed to prevent State and federal agencies from rigging the bidding process by withholding critical site information.

However, Illinois local governments are not so restricted.  The “superior knowledge rule” has not been applied to them and local government officials are largely left free to choose what they will or will not disclose to bidders.  Local government contracts commonly include broad “big boy clauses” specifically saying that a bidder has had a full opportunity to inspect the construction site, evaluate any boring logs as may or may not be available, and even to independently drill borings of its own.  But, the reality of the situation may be very different.  There may be no time to do additional borings and even if there was, the excavator might not be paid for making its own boring.  Borings may be known but not disclosed and FOIA requests may take too long to uncover the information before the time for submitting bids has been exhausted.  A “big boy clause” could be used by the government entity to deny a change order (based on changed conditions) when the truth about the project or the construction site becomes known to the contractor after construction has begun.

Thus, when preparing a bid on a local government job, a bidder must be very cautious about accepting the information disclosed by the local government in the bidding package as true.

David J. Lloyd



Update: SB-3023 Passed Out of Committee

This past Tuesday, I testified before the Illinois Senate Judiciary Committee on behalf of the construction industry in support of SB-3023.  SB-3023 proposes new legislation making provisions in construction contracts to agree to subordinate mechanics lien rights unenforceable and against public policy. You can read more about SB-3032 in a prior blog post –

After over an hour’s worth of testimony and many questions from the senators on the committee, I am very pleased to report that the bill passed out of the committee and will be heard on the Senate floor for a vote.  I was impressed by how knowledgeable the senators were and how willing they were to spend time to understand this issue.

Here’s how the Committee voted:

Senator Kwame Raoul (Chairman) – PRESENT

Senator John Mulroe (Vice Chair, Sponsor) – YES

Senator Haine – YES

Senator Don Harmon – YES

Senator Michael Hastings – YES

Senator Toi Hutchinson was absent. However, Sen. Terry Link was subbed in for her and voted – YES

Senator Michael Noland – YES

Senator Ira Silverstein – YES

Senator Kirk Dillard – absent from committee

Senator Jason Barickman – NO

Senator Darin LaHood – NO

Senator Dale Righter – YES

If any of the above senators who voted Yes or PRESENT is your state senator, I ask that you please email or call him or her and thank them for supporting the construction industry.  SB-3023 is still far from becoming law and we will need their ongoing support!

Please check back here regularly for continued updates on the status of SB-3023 as well as other legislation affecting the Illinois construction industry.

James T. Rohlfing